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THE DANGERS OF THE UNION 
By Henry Wheaton 
Edited and With an Introduction by James E. Pfander* 
From May to August 1821, Henry Wheaton published The 
Dangers of the Union, a series of eight essays defending the 
Supreme Court and Chief Justice John Marshall's then recent de-
cision in Cohens v. Virginia.! Wheaton's essays appeared under 
the pseudonym "A Federalist of 1789"2 and have been a subject 
of some interest to students of the Marshall Court. Professor G. 
Edward White, for example, features the Wheaton essays in his 
discussion of the pamphlet wars that broke out in the wake of the 
Cohens decision.3 As Professor White notes,4 the Wheaton es-
says sought in part to counter such "Richmond Junto" critics of 
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. Thanks to Guy Ward, Jason Thmer, and 
Bill Tapella for research assistance. 
1. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 284 (1821). For a more complete account of Wheaton's life 
and work, see Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Coun Reponer: An Institutional Per-
spective on Marshall Coun Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 (1985); Elizabeth F. Baker, 
Henry Wheaton, 1785-1848 (U. of Pa. Press, 1937). Gerald Gunther first identified Whea-
ton as the author of the series on the basis of a review of Wheaton's papers in the Pier-
pont Morgan library in New York. For confirmation, see Letter from John C. Calhoun to 
Henry Wheaton, July 15, 1821, in W. Edwin Hemphill, ed., 6 The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn 259-60 (U. of S. Carolina Press, 1972) ("Letter from John C. Calhoun") (describing 
Calhoun's receipt of a note from Wheaton enclosing the "2d number of [A] Federalist of 
'89" and discussing strategies for its republication to counter essays in Virginia and Ohio 
criticizing the Cohens decision). 
2. Wheaton explained his use of this pseudonym at the beginning of one of the 
early articles in the series: "To prevent any misconstruction of the political principles 
meant to be designated by the signature assumed by the writer of the following numbers, 
it may be proper to state that they are those which he entertains in common with the early 
advocates of our Federal Constitution, and have no reference to subsequent party 
distinctions." 
3. See G. Edward White, The Marshall Coun and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 in 
Paul A. Freund and Stanley N. Katz, eds., 3-4 History of the Supreme Coun of the United 
States 521-22 (Macmillan Pub. Co., 1988) ("The Marshall Coun"). 
4. Professor White portrays Wheaton's essays as entirely the product of Roane's 
attack. See id. (suggesting that Roane's attack nettled John Marshall and moved him to 
enlist Wheaton to counter the attack on Cohens). Although Wheaton spends a good deal 
of time replying to Roane, he does not appear to have initiated the series in response to 
the Roane essays. The first number of Wheaton's series appeared on May 8, 1821-
before the initial number of the Roane series on May 25-and responds to other critics of 
Cohens. It was only in Wheaton's second number, which appeared in July after the 
Roane series had run its course, that he first took up the Roane critique. 
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the Marshall Court as Spencer Roane,s whose essays under the 
pen-name Algernon Sidney advocated a compact theory of the 
Union much at odds with the national vision of the Chief 
Justice.6 
The Wheaton essays, reprinted here in their entirety in this 
and the next issue, deserve wider circulation. Of interest to his-
torians, the essays also shed light on a variety of contemporary 
issues in federal jurisdiction. For Wheaton not only offers a co-
gent defense of the assertion of jurisdiction in Cohens, he also 
offers a fairly detailed account of Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment. Of particular importance to federal courts schol-
ars, Wheaton appears to have accepted a two-tier theory of fed-
eral judicial power similar to that advocated by Justice Joseph 
Story in Manin v. Hunter's Lessee.? Wheaton also reads the 
Eleventh Amendment, much like modem diversity theorists, as 
curtailing only those suits and proceedings against state parties in 
which federal jurisdiction depends on the alignment of the 
parties.s 
Historians have treated Wheaton's work as virtually an offi-
cial defense of Cohens;9 certainly Wheaton's position as the 
Court's reporter at the time the essays appeared and his close 
relationship with Marshall and Story lends strength to such an 
interpretation.to But Wheaton's analysis deserves notice on its 
own terms as well. He was a well-known legal scholar and advo-
cate: he played an important role in amending New York's con-
A nice account of the place of Wheaton's essays in the newspaper debates over Co-
hens appears in W. Ray Luce, Cohens v. Vrrginia (I82I): The Supreme Court and Srou 
Rights, a Reevaluation of Influences and Impacts 165-86, 193-231 (Garland Pub., 1990). 
As Luce explains, "Wheaton's essay started a veritable avalanche of long, detailed essays 
examining the case during the late spring and early summer of 1821," including two series 
of essays in Vrrginia in addition to those by Roane. Id at 166. 
5. For accounts, see Margaret E. Horsnell, Spencer Roane: Judidol AdvOCille of 
Jeffersoniim Principles (Garland Pub., 1986); Note, Judge Spencer Roane of Vll'ginia: 
Champion of StllleS' Rights-Foe of John Manhall, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1953). 
6. Roane's five essays have been reprinted in William E. Dodd, ed., 2 John P. 
Branch Hist. Papers of Randolph-Macon CoUege 78-183 (1905). 
7. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For a powerful statement of the theory, see Akhil 
R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist Vzew of Article III: Separating the 1Wo 1iers of Federal Juris-
diction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985) (arguing that Article lii divides the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts into mandatory and permissive tiers). 
8. For a nice overview of the current Eleventh Amendment debate, see Wtlliam A. 
Fletcher, The Diversity Exp/IJnalion of the Eleventh Amendment A Reply to Critks, 56 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1261 (1989). 
9. See White, The Manhall Court at 522 (cited in note 3). 
10. As reporter, Wheaton published many of the greatest opinions of the Marshall 
Court, including Martin v. Hunter's wsee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), McCo/Juch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Osborn v. Bank of the United Stlltes, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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stitution; he was frequently mentioned as a possible nominee to 
the Court; and he published two works (Elements of International 
Law (1836) and The History of the Law of Nations in Europe and 
America (1845)) that quickly became classics in their field. 
The Wheaton essays also demonstrate that the nature of 
constitutional government and the obligation of the states to ac-
cept federal definition of the scope of federal power were issues 
much on the mind of the day's political thinkers. To be sure, at 
the time Wheaton wrote, Congress had pasted over the slavery 
crisis with the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Yet Wheaton 
plainly understood that issues of state sovereignty would recur, 
and repeatedly emphasized throughout the essays that accepting 
the position of the Court's critics would mean the end of the 
Union. Ironically enough, the man who would later become the 
nation's leading apostle of interposition-John C. Calhoun-be-
lieved Cohens to have been rightly decided at the time and 
joined with Wheaton in developing strategies to republish Whea-
ton's defense of national authority.lt 
* * * * * * * * 
Editor's Note: 
The first four essays appear in this issue; the remaining four 
essays will appear in the next issue. Professor Pfander has re-
tained the somewhat anachronistic spellings and modest misquo-
tations in Wheaton's original essays. He has, however, corrected 
typographical errors and has also altered punctuation where the 
original was unduly confusing. Wheaton's footnotes appear as 
they did in the original with asterisks; Professor Pfander's ex-
planatory footnotes have been numbered. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
N0.1. 
(The American, May 8, 1821) 
Whoever has reflected upon the public transactions of this 
country since the war of the revolution, must be convinced that 
we have degenerated in public virtue. Professions of patriotism, 
indeed, abound in the present time; but that disinterested love of 
country which marked our first efforts against the parent state is 
almost extinguished, or is smothered by the intrigues of.corrupt 
faction. The encroachments which have been continually making 
11. See Letter from John C. Calhoun at 260 (cited in note 1) (proposing republica-
tion of Wheaton's essays in Virginia at the "seat of the disease"). 
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by unprincipled demagogues against that National Government 
which is the only sure guarantee of our republican institutions, 
and of private rights, as well as our shield against foreign aggres-
sion, have been viewed with so much supineness and indiffer-
ence, or opposed with so little moral courage, by those whose 
duty it was to resist them, that I cannot help regarding those re-
peated attacks upon the authority of the Union as among the 
worst signs of the times. One of the most remarkable instances of 
this profligate daring on the part of the enemies of the National 
Government will be found in the recent attempt to resist the au-
thority of the Supreme Court of the United States to determine, 
in the last resort, all questions arising under the Constitution and 
laws of the Union. One would think if there was any one prerog-
ative of the Federal Government more undeniable than another, 
it was this. It is, in fact, the great conservative power of the 
Union. 
We all remember Mr. CLINTON's denunciation of the Gen-
eral Government for its alleged attempt to force the sale of tick-
ets in a lottery established by Congress, at the city of 
Washington, for local purposes, throughout the several states, in 
defiance of the laws of those states prohibiting such sale; when, 
in fact, Congress had not authorized their sale beyond the limits 
of the District of Columbia, nor had the President countenanced 
it, nor the courts of the Union at that time expressed any opinion 
upon the question. But it suited the views of Mr. Clinton to 
chime in with the language of certain state demagogues in other 
quarters, who affected great alarm for the rights of the states, 
because they were not permitted to trample those of the National 
Government and of individuals under their feet. This denuncia-
tion was peculiarly adapted to inflame the passions of the people 
of Ohio, who had been by base arts excited to hostility against 
one of the principal institutions of the government,tz and whose 
favour it has been one of Mr. Clinton's chief objects to cultivate 
by all the means in his power, with a view to the "all hail hereaf-
ter." It was also intended to extort the applause of some of the 
leading politicians of Virginia, from whom we might have ex-
pected better things, but whose doctrines respecting the powers 
of the General Government I consider as most pernicious here-
12. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See also 
Message of His Excellency Oliver Wolcott, to the General Assembly of the State of Con-
necticut, at the Commencement of their Session 12-26 (May, 1821) (on file with the Con-
necticut State Library) ("Wolcott") (responding in part to a resolution adopted by the 
State of Ohio to exert a penalizing tax upon the Bank of the United States). 
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sies, although supported by the subtlety of acute and ingenious 
minds. 
The question which has recently been much agitated in that 
state respecting the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in cases arising in the state courts respecting the 
laws and Constitution of the Union, is one of the most vitally 
important constitutional questions that has been discussed since 
the establishment of the present National Government. I feel all 
due respect for some of those gentlemen in Virginia; I doubt not 
they are perfectly sincere in the views they have taken of the 
Constitution? but at the same time I must frankly declare my 
impression that those views have arisen from an original anti-
federal bias in their minds, and an undue jealously of the author-
ity of the National Government, arising from the ill-judged acts 
of a former administration. That those views are entirely errone-
ous I am firmly convinced; but if they are correct, then are the 
Constitution, and laws, and treaties of the Union, a dead letter. 
Very able political and professional men are satisfied that 
the whole argument against the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court has been completely demolished in the opinion delivered 
by Chief Justice MARSHALL, at the last term, in the case of 
Cohens against Virginia;t3 and certainly it bears the strongest 
marks of his acute and enlarged mind, which when it applies it-
self to the interpretation of the fundamental law, soars above the 
ordinary element of a judge and a technical lawyer, and displays 
the wisdom and skill of a great lawgiver. But there are some 
considerations of a more popular and obvious nature, which 
strike my mind as conclusive that the argument against the juris-
diction, however it may be entangled with met;tphysical subtle-
ties, must be fallacious and unsound. 
I suppose no person will deny that the Constitution, laws, 
and treaties of the United States must be paramount to the laws 
of the particular States of the Union, or they are nothing: of 
course, I mean such laws and treaties as are made in conformity 
with the Constitution. This supremacy is expressly declared in 
the Constitution; and if it were not declared, it must necessarily 
be so, from the very nature of our federative government. 
Where there is collision and repugnancy, the parts cannot control 
the whole; the whole must control the parts: otherwise there 
would be worse confusion than if we had no General 
Government. 
13. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
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Assuming this to be undeniable, I should be glad if some 
gentleman better versed in these matters than I can pretend to 
be, would inform me how this supremacy can be asserted and 
enforced, in a legal and peaceable manner, but by exerting that 
very appellate power which is by some denied to the Supreme 
Court. 
I can conceive of only two modes in which this object could 
be accomplished. One is, by doing what Congress has attempted 
to do in the Judiciary law of 1789,14 giving the Supreme Court of 
the Union appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising in the State 
Courts involving the construction or application of the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties or the United States; Or the enactment of 
a law for removing from the State Courts all such cases, the in-
stant the question under the Constitution, &c. arises, and before 
any trial or determination in the State Court respecting it. 
I own that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion has satisfied me 
that the mode of dealing with this difficult subject which Con-
gress has adopted is conformable to the constitution, and that 
there are besides some technical difficulties in removing this class 
of causes from the State to the National Courts, before a final 
decision in the former. If the cause were thus evoked from the 
state tribunal, before a final adjudication, it might tum out that 
no question under the constitution, &c, of the U.S. was involved 
in the cause, and it would be idle for the federal tribunals to take 
jurisdiction where they could not finally decide. So that this 
would be a most obnoxious interference with the jurisdiction of 
the state courts. 
Be this as it may, it is perfectly clear that the supreme court 
must have authority to decide in all cases of repugnancy or colli-
sion between the State and National authorities, which can be at 
all the subject of judicial cognizance. These cases cannot be fi-
nally and conclusively determined by both state and federal 
tribunals. They cannot be exclusively determined by the state 
courts: for that would create as many clashing rules as there are 
States in the Union. Such a notion reduces the present national 
constitution to something less or worse than the old confedera-
tion. It makes it a mere treaty between independent powers. 
Every dispute respecting its interpretation must be the subject of 
negotiation: If that fails, there is no other resort than reprisals or 
war. Ohio has begun with reprisals? God grant that some other 
state may not resort to arms! 
14. 1 Stat. 73 § 25 (1789). 
1995] DANGERS OF THE UNION 255 
Let us suppose, that during the late restrictive system, all the 
custom-house officers in those parts of the country where it was 
unpopular had been sued in the state court for performing their 
duty under the embargo and non-intercourse laws. In vain would 
they plead the laws of congress in their justification. A 
prejudiced judge, and a jury inflamed with party feelings, pro-
nounce judgment against them. They appeal to the highest tribu-
nal of the state. The judgment is confirmed. Where can they 
resort for protection but to the superintending authority of that 
august tribunal to whom the protection of the constitution and 
laws of the union has been confided. 
The case I have put has actually occurred in many instances. 
The officer acting under the authority of the union has appealed 
to its highest court; and if he has done no more than his duty, has 
been protected.lS 
Many parallel instances might be mentioned. What pre-
vented the Bank of the U.S. from being expelled from the states 
by their taxing power, but the exertion of this salutary authority 
in the supreme court?t6 What prevents the whole machinery of 
the federal government from being stopped by the smallest state 
in the union, but the consciousness that this authority would be 
exerted, if they passed the limits which the constitution has pre-
scribed. Were it not for this, the country would be inundated 
with paper money, made a tender for debts; the sacredness of 
private contracts would be sported with: one bad example set, in 
a moment of passion and excitement, by a particular state, would 
be followed by all the rest: and that scene of universal confusion 
and distress which succeeded the peace of 1783, and from which 
the present constitution redeemed us, would again overspread 
the land. I do not believe that it will be necessary that this power 
of the supreme court should be often exerted. It operates silently 
and imperceptibly like the voice of conscience; but it must some-
times be made audible and imperative in order to restrain the 
attacks which will be attempted upon the bulwarks of the 
constitution. 
15. But see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). In Little, the captain of 
an American frigate had captured a Danish vessel while acting under a presidential order 
issued pursuant to an act of Congress. The Court found the order to have been based 
upon an erroneous interpretation of the statute; therefore the seizure was illegal. The 
Court then held the captain personally liable: Presidential "instructions cannot change the 
nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have 
been a plain trespass." ld. at 179. 
16. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
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N0.2. 
(The American, July 10, 1821) 
I have been prevented from continuing these numbers by 
circumstances beyond my control, but of no importance to the 
public. Since my last number, I have seen with pleasure its prin-
ciples vindicated by that consistent and venerable patriot, Gover-
nor Wolcott, of Connecticut, who in his late message to the 
Legislature of that state17 has fearlessly encountered the respon-
sibility of denouncing doctrines supported by specious and plau-
sible sophistry, and recommended by a show of temporary and 
local popularity, but utterly destitute of a foundation in truth and 
reason, and which, if they should be countenanced by the appro-
bation of the American people, must ultimately end in the ruin of 
their liberty and happiness.1s I have also read with attention, and 
I must say with disgust, the furious attack made by a writer under 
the signature of Algernon Sidney,19 in the Richmond Enquirer, 
on the Supreme Court of the United States.zo Although, I con-
17. Wolcott at 12-26 (cited in note 12). 
18. Id. 
Our National Constitution exhibits the only attempt which has ever been 
made to extend equal rights to the people of a great Country, and to restrain 
powerful communities, by the influence of reason exerted in the mild forms of 
judicial authority .... If this system cannot protect the weak against the strong; if 
it does not rely upon reason and law, and not upon force, it is nothing .... 
As all the possible combinations of rights and interests cannot be foreseen, 
an important question of constitutional law, may be imagined to arise on a trial 
before a justice of the Peace in this State. His decision, it is well known, may be 
affirmed or reversed by the supreme court of errors, and afterwards the decision 
of the justice may be affirmed by the supreme court of the United States, yet it is 
impossible to perceive how any of these decisions would increase or diminish the 
power, or disturb or displace either of these jurisdictions in relation to each 
other, or in the least, disparage the dignity of the legislature of this State. The 
whole of the proceedings might exhibit nothing more than an ordinary case of a 
diversity of opinion, on a doubtful question of law, which had been judicially 
decided in the court of [last] resort. Such a case may however be imagined, as 
would afford a fit illustration of the peculiar moral excellence of our system of 
national government, in the protection of a humble individual, against the exer-
cise of illegal and unconstitutional power. 
Id. at 20, 22. 
19. A leader of the English revolution and a martyr to the cause of republican gov-
ernment, Algernon Sidney was much revered by the founding generation in America. For 
an overview of his life and an analysis of his work and its influence on the framers, see 
Alan C. Houston, Algernon Sidney and the Republican Heritage in England and America 
(Princeton U. Press, 1991). Sidney was put to death in 1683 for his part in a plot on 
Charles II of England. In choosing Sidney's name for the series, Roane probably meant 
to invoke Sidney's support for republican principles and his opposition to centralized gov-
ernment. Roane had borrowed the name of one of Sidney's co-conspirators, John 
Hampden, in mounting his earlier attack on Marshall's decision in McCoUuch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Houston, supra at 274. 
20. Spencer Roane [Algernon Sidney pseud.], Virginia Opposition to Chief Justice 
Marshall: On the Lottery Decision, Richmond Enquirer, May 25, 29, June 1, 5, 8, 1821, 
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fess, I felt some surprize that a writer who has undertaken, in the 
tone of authority, to instruct his fellow-citizens, and to correct 
the errors of the highest judicial tribunals of the country, had not 
even suspected that the command of his own temper might be a 
necessary qualification for his task, yet I have followed him 
through all his numbers, looking earnestly for that semblance of 
evidence and of argument which might have persuaded himself, 
at least, that his charges were not wholly destitute of foundation. 
But I have looked in vain. 
Algernon Sidney has occupied ample ground, made broad 
and sweeping assertions, and alleged serious charges, both of 
criminal misconduct, and criminal intention, against judges as 
learned and able as any this country can boast. So heavy and 
aggravated are these charges even in his own opinion, that he 
takes merit to himself for wanting "no insurrections, no rebel-
lions, no revolutions"21-for condescending to address his re-
monstrances to the people "in [their] primary and sovereign 
character,"zz and merely beseeching them "in that character to 
correct the proceedings of [their] subordinate agents."23 A high, 
co-ordinate department of the National government, in the regu-
lar discharge of its ordinary constitutional functions, has per-
formed a duty which was expressly imposed upon it by law, and 
which it could not avoid. This duty has been performed consci-
entiously and diligently, without the possibility of a motive which 
could willfully lead astray; but it has not been performed to the 
taste of Algernon Sidney: and yet this moderate gentlemen is so 
very cool and temperate as to want "no insurrections, no rebel-
lions, no revolutions,"24 as only to invite the people "in [their] 
primary and sovereign character"zs to correct these proceedings; 
that is, if I comprehend him, to reverse this decision, and to make 
it what he shall dictate. 
To accomplish this design, he charges the Judges of the 
Supreme Court with completely negativing the idea that the 
American States have a real existence, as such;26 with usurping a 
right to amend and alter the Federal Constitution at their will 
and pleasure;21 with feigning cases for this purpose;ZB with erect-
reprinted in William E. Dodd, ed., 2 John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Ma-
con College 78-183 (1905) ("Roane"). 
21. Id. at 79. 
22. ld. at 78. 
23. Id. at 78-79. 
24. ld. at 79. 
25. ld. at 78. 
26. ld. at 80. 
27. ld. at 80-81. 
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ing a petty corporation above the legislatures of the states,29 and 
exalting an ordinance of the Common Hall of the city of Wash-
ington to the dignity of a statute of the United States;30 with de-
nying the competency of the state tribunals to enforce their own 
penal laws against their own offending citizens;3t with claiming a 
right to bring the states before the court in all cases whatsoever, 
and that in the very teeth of several articles of the Constitution;32 
with giving this "monstrous and unexampled decision, "33 without 
any apology, without the support of any statute to warrant it;34 
and with a climax of arrogance and absurdity, which will admit 
but of one higher grade, and that is to claim their powers by di-
vine authority, and in utter contempt of the sovereign power of 
the people.35 
These are among the many grave and serious crimes for 
which this writer has thought proper to arraign the Supreme 
Court of the Union before the people of Virginia. Mistaking 
himself, or hoping that his readers might mistake, "the venom of 
the shaft for the vigour of the bow," he has scattered opprobrious 
epithets throughout these extraordinary, I had almost said fan-
tastic, accusations, with the heedless profusion of an unthinking 
prodigal, who, supposing the fund on which he draws to be inex-
haustible, is entirely regardless of the occasion or the subject on 
which he wastes it. 
Had I no other object than merely to vindicate the Supreme 
Court, it would be sufficient to say that these charges are all and 
each of them founded on the grossest misrepresentation. Not 
only are they unwarranted by the opinion in the case of Cohen 
against Virginia, which is so palpably traduced, but there are 
many of them expressly, and all of them simultaneously, contra-
dicted by it. 
The Judges of that court have not negatived (either ex-
pressly or by implication) the idea that the American States have 
a real existence, but have proceeded on the idea that they are 
great, powerful, and essential parts of that general system, which 
the American People have adopted for the preservation of their 
happiness, their liberty, and their very existence. 
28. ld. at 93, 171. 
29. Id. at 81. 
30. Id. at 82. 
31. Id. at 81. 
32. ld. at 81-82. 
33. Id. at 82. 
34. Id. at 82-83. 
35. Id. at 84. 
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They have not usurped the right to alter and amend the Fed-
eral Constitution at their will and pleasure. Had they claimed 
such a right, they would have proved themselves fitter subjects 
for bedlam than the bench they would have disgraced. So far 
from making such absurd, extravagant, and traitorous preten-
sions they have, on all occasions, manifested the most profound 
reverence for that sacred charter of our liberties, and the most 
explicit obedience to its mandates. 
They have not feigned cases for this, or for any other pur-
pose. The authority Algernon Sidney quotes in support of this 
serious charge, makes directly against him, and shows the watch-
ful jealousy with which the court guards against any attempt of 
the kind which might possibly be made, for Mr. Justice JOHN-
SON did not say, as he is made to say by A.S.,36 that Fletcher v. 
Peck37 was a feigned case. That distinguished Judge could not 
permit himself to make an assertion so totally unsupported by 
any evidence in his possession. He expressed the suspicions he 
had entertained, suspicions which, though destitute of proof, had 
produced a consequent reluctance to give any opinion in the 
case; but added, that "[m]y confidence, however, in the respecta-
ble gentlemen who have been engaged for the parties, has in-
duced me to abandon my scruples, in the belief that they would 
never consent to impose a mere feigned case upon this 
court."38- And yet, upon such testimony as this, Algernon Sid-
ney has the hardihood to assert, that the court feigned cases for 
its sinister purposes. 
The Judges have not erected a petty corporation above the 
legislatures of the States, nor have they exalted an ordinance of 
the Common Hall of the city of Washington to the dignity of a 
statute of the United States. No part of the opinion in the case of 
Cohens against Virginia, no expression it contains can possibly be 
tortured into the slightest justification of these daring assertions. 
No weight is ascribed to this or to any other act of the corpora-
tion. But laws cannot execute themselves: they must be executed 
by agents, and the question, how far the act of the agent may be 
authorized by the law, must necessarily enter into the considera-
tion of every case in which the validity of those acts is to be ex-
amined. Algernon Sidney may reject such considerations, but no 
Judge can permit himself to disregard them. 
36. Id. at 93 n.d. 
37. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
38. Id. at 147-48 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part). 
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It is not true that the opinion in question denies the compe-
tency of the State Courts to enforce their own penal laws against 
their own offending citizens. This competency has not been 
drawn into question. Neither on this, nor on any other occasion, 
has so wild and extravagant a notion, as questioning this compe-
tency would be, found its way to the judicial department of the 
United States. But the constitution is, and was intended to be, a 
shield for the protection of those who execute laws made in pur-
suance of it, and the infliction of a penalty on such persons, by 
state authority, or by any other authority, is a violation of the 
constitution. The court supposes that the constitution has pro-
vided a remedy for such a case, and this opinion is denounced as 
a denial of the competency of the courts of the states to enforce 
their own penal laws against their own citizens. Is it not wonder-
ful that the same spirit which construes any subordination of the 
state governments to the Union into an extinction of those gov-
ernments, should also construe the assertion of a right to protect 
the constitution of the Union from violation into a denial of the 
right of the State Courts to punish their citizens offending against 
their own laws? 
The Judges have not claimed a right, in the teeth of several 
articles of the Constitution, to bring the States before the 
Supreme Court in all cases whatsoever. They disclaim any such 
right, but believe themselves bound to take cognizance of any 
case brought before them, so far as the Constitution or laws of 
the United States may be involved in it. They are not "hungry 
after jurisdiction," but they cannot decline it when it is clearly 
given to them by the Constitution, without committing a crime 
against the Constitution, and without violating their oaths.39 But 
they have manifested, on more than one occasion, an anxiety to 
avoid taking cognizance of causes not absolutely forced upon 
them by their duty and their oaths, and always look with critical 
eyes into every record that comes before them, in order to see 
whether they have jurisdiction upon its face. If they find it not, 
the cause is instantly dismissed, even though the parties are will-
ing to waive the defect. Such was the fate of the cause which was 
carried up from the Court of Errors of this state in order to test 
the legality of the grant to Chancellor Livingston and Mr. Fulton 
of the exclusive right to navigate our waters with steam boats. 
39. Here, Wheaton refers to dicta in Cohens in which Marshall describes the obliga-
tion of a court to exercise its jurisdiction: "We have no more right to decline the exercise 
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 404 (1821). For an update, see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543 (1985). 
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If the decision in the case of Cohens against Virginia be, 
what Algernon Sidney, in his own peculiarly happy and select 
diction, has been pleased to denominate it-"monstrous and un-
exampled"40-it is yet not true that it was made without apology, 
and without the support of any statute. The 25th section of the 
judiciary act of 1789, in express terms comprehends the case; and 
this writer himself, in one of his subsequent Numbers, forgetting 
this rash assertion in the first, admits that it does confer the juris-
diction he controverts.41 If indeed the Court has reached a "cli-
max of arrogance and absurdity" which will admit of but one 
higher grade,42 it is to be regretted that the task of correcting its 
errors, and changing its course, has not devolved on one who 
would execute it more fairly, more temperately, more rationally, 
and consequently with a better prospect of success: On one who 
would entitle himself to some share of our confidence by stating 
truly and candidly the opinion he censures, and supporting his 
censures by arguments drawn from the Constitution. 
Not contented with arraigning the constitutional principles 
contained in this opinion, Algernon Sidney is dissatisfied with its 
form and structure. Besides its more important defects, it is, he 
says, unusually "tedious [and] tautologous."43 It is no part of my 
design to discuss the merits of this opinion in point of style and 
composition. I confess I am not so fastidious a critic as Algernon 
Sidney; but if we recollect the great mass of important business 
which loads the docket of the Supreme Court, the intricate ques-
tions and able discussions to which the attention of the Judges 
must be directed, even while preparing opinions in causes which 
have been previously argued; we ought not to be surprized at the 
defects, if there be defects, in the diction, the arrangement, or the 
length, of any opinions they may deliver. It is not elegance of 
style, but soundness of decision, at which they ought chiefly to 
aim. But I believe this writer stands alone in denying to this pa-
per every essential quality of style which should be regarded in 
drawing up the solemn judgment of a court of justice: and I can-
not avoid observing that this hypercritic censures the tediousness 
I d. 
40. Roane at 82 (cited in note 20). 
41. See, e.g., id. at 138. 
[The Supreme Court] take[s] the famous ground that is taken by the twenty-fifth 
section of the judicial act of Congress, namely, that a state court deciding in 
favor of an act of Congress is always right but always wrong when it decides 
against it. Nay, that act, I had almost said that absurd and ridiculous act, allows 
an appeal to the federal court in the last case, and denies it in the first. 
42. Id. at 84. 
43. Id. at 88. 
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of an opinion of eleven columns, whilst he fills more than twenty-
six in discussing the same question; that he arraigns the offence 
of tautology in a series of numbers containing more repetitions 
than I can readily enumerate; and that this lucid order leaves the 
reader perplexed and puzzled to arrange in his own mind the 
points which have been discussed. But it is nothing new to think 
our neighbor blind because a mote is perceived in his eye, whilst 
we are confident in the perfection of our own vision though ob-
scured by a beam. 
N0.3 
(The American, July 23, 1821) 
To the gross and unfounded accusations against the Supreme 
Court already noticed, I must be permitted to add some others 
which equally mark the peculiar spirit of malignity in which the 
strictures of Algernon Sidney are written. 
Without wasting a moment on his singular reasoning re-
specting the word "protection,"44 or a still more singular conclu-
sion drawn from that reasoning, I shall proceed to his assertion 
that the prosecution of the Commonwealth of Virginia against 
Cohens might have been carried to a higher court in that State 
than the one in which it originated.4s Not professing to under-
stand the peculiar judicial system of Virginia, I shall not enter 
into any controversy with this writer respecting the exposition of 
their statutes; nor should I notice this assertion at all, but for the 
invidious object with which it was made. For this reason only, I 
shall venture to remark, that in the case of Bedinger against The 
Commonwealth, reported in Call's Rep. words not very unlike 
those contained in the particular statute on which Algernon Sid-
ney has pronounced so confidently, were construed by the Court 
of Appeals of that state not to confer appellate jurisdiction, and 
the Judges express themselves in language strongly applicable to 
the case of Virginia against Cohens-I am also informed by some 
gentlemen of the bar, in whose information I place great confi-
dence, that no case whatever has occurred in which this jurisdic-
tion has been exercised; that there is no instance in Virginia, 
since the case cited from Call's Reports, of an appeal from the 
judgment of a court rendered in any criminal prosecution 
whatever. This fact goes far to show the universal understanding 
on the subject, and there are many circumstances attending the 
case which add to its influence. 
44. Id. at 91-92. 
45. Id. at 92. 
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Cohens, the defendant,46 prayed an appeal from the judg-
ment against him, which the Borough Court of Norfolk refused 
to allow, upon the ground, expressly stated on the record, that 
"cases of this sort are not subject to revision by any other court 
of the commonwealth."47 
The attention bestowed by the legislature of Virginia upon 
this case, and upon the writ of error issued to remove it to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, is well known throughout 
the whole country. The report of the committee to whom the 
subject was referred-the amendments offered to that report-
the resolutions ultimately adopted-have all long been before 
the public. In no one of these papers was the idea suggested that 
the writ of error was premature, and that the cause ought to have 
been carried to a higher State tribunal before it was brought to 
the Supreme Court of the United States. In debate, so far at 
least as the debates have been published, it was never suggested. 
I presume the legislature of Virginia, like that of every other 
State, abounds with lawyers whose practice would necessarily 
lead to an intimate acquaintance with this subject. Yet in scrap-
ing together all sorts of incongruous matter to cast odium on this 
proceeding, the idea that the judgment had not been given by a 
court of the last resort never entered into any of the wise heads 
who had undertaken to examine this subject. Could it even be 
supposed that this material circumstance had escaped the "optics 
keen" of the gentlemen of the Virginia bar, their Court of Ap-
peals is known to have been in session at the same time with the 
legislature. Far be it from me to insinuate that the members of 
that court would sully "the pure ermine" of which Algernon Sid-
ney talks so much,48 by taking the lead, or mingling in the ques-
tions which agitate and inflame mere party politicians. Without 
derogating from the calm and mild dignity, which is, I doubt not, 
the attribute of that high tribunal, it must be supposed that in the 
frequent conversational discussions produced by the occasion, 
the idea that the case was cognizable in a higher court would 
have been intimated had it been entertained. Had it been inti-
mated, it must have reached the ears of the legislature: and had it 
reached their ears, it would have been urged by the counsel of 
Virginia at the bar of the Supreme Court. The legislature in-
structed their counsel to object to the jurisdiction; yet this ground 
46. Actually, the case involved two Cohens-brothers P.J. and MJ. Cohen. Cohens 
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 265 (1821). 
47. Id. at 290. 
48. See, e.g., Roane at 79, 83, 84 (cited in note 20). 
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of objection, which, if well founded, would have been fatal, was 
neither suggested by Virginia nor by her counsel. 
When these circumstances come to be considered, the deci-
sion of Algernon Sidney, however confidently and peremptorily 
pronounced, may well be doubted. But, be this as it may, how-
ever this question may be settled hereafter, the mind of that man 
must be of no ordinary structure, who, in such a case, can permit 
himself to say, that the Supreme Court considered the Court for 
the Borough of Norfolk as the highest tribunal of the State in 
which the cause was cognizable, not because such had been the 
decision of the State Court itself; not because such appeared to 
be the opinion of Virginia and her counsel; but "for the purpose 
of giving themselves jurisdiction:"49-who could permit himself 
suggest that this was "a feigned case:"so-who could assert, in 
opposition to the very fact on which he founds the assertion, that 
" [a] practice of that kind is not without example in that high 
court:"sl-who could add that "[s]uch a practice may be, also, 
very convenient to the supreme court, in furthering its favorite 
object of expounding the Constitution, in the gross, and settling, 
by anticipation, the real causes which may come before it. "sz 
The fitness of such a mind for the discussion of a great constitu-
tional question, or the candour and fairness of the criticism it has 
dictated upon the decision of that question by the competent tri-
bunal, requires no comment. 
In stating the points on which the motion to dismiss the writ 
of error was supported, one was said by the Court to be, "[t]hat a 
State is a defendant;"s3-which is asserted by Algernon Sidney 
not to be "a candid or accurate statement of the objection."54 
But all who are conversant with the usage of courts of justice, 
know well that a point is often, with perfect proprietary, stated 
briefly, without mentioning various qualifying circumstances 
which may form subdivisions of the general question. But in the 
passage quoted, the court do not make their own statements, but, 
in terms, refer to the points as made by the counsel for Virginia. 
Mr. Barbour, after urging that the jurisdiction, if given, was origi-
nal, and not appellate, said, "my last proposition is, that, consid-
ering the nature of this case, and that a State is a party, the 
judicial power of the United States does not extend to the case, 
49. ld. at 92. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 376 (1821). 
54. Roane at 94 (cited in note 20). 
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and that, therefore, this court cannot take jurisdiction at all. "55 
And he again states, in the same connexion, that without refer-
ence to the particular character of the case, "the judicial power of 
the United States does not extend to it, on account of the charac-
ter of one of the parties; in other words, because one of the par-
ties is a State."56 
This argument was published in the Richmond Enquirer, 
before Algernon Sidney wrote. If it could not have prevented his 
asserting that the statement made by the court "[was] not a can-
did or accurate statement of the objection,"57 ought not both 
candour and accuracy to have induced him to erase these epi-
thets, when he read the statement actually made by the court on 
proceeding to consider the objection? That statement is in these 
words: "The first question to be considered is, whether the juris-
diction of this court is excluded by the character of the parties, 
one of them being a State, and the other a citizen of that State. "58 
The court then take a comprehensive view of the arguments 
which had been urged, and state them in their full force. 
How jaundiced must be that eye which can perceive in this 
proceeding an unworthy and silly attempt to elude an argument 
which could not be answered, by an "uncandid and inaccurate 
statement" of that argument! 
It is not in the conduct of the Supreme Court that we are to 
look for examples of this unworthiness or folly. 
But too much time has already been bestowed on the tem-
per with which Algernon Sidney addresses the public. I forbear, 
therefore, to produce further specimens of it, and shall proceed 
to subjects of deeper and more extensive interest. 
It is scarcely possible to suppose that the extreme bitterness 
of this writer can proceed from personal resentment. His hatred 
is directed against the judicial authority of the Union; and the 
judges are too much dispersed over the country to be, many of 
them, even known to the same individual. His feelings then, are 
political, not personal. When we reflect on the immense impor-
tance of the judicial department to the government of the 
Union-that it is an instrument indispensable to the preservation 
of the constitution, and the peaceable execution of the laws-
that, being separated from the busy and active part of society, 
and from the other departments of the government, it is without 
55. See Wheaton's Reports, Vol. 6, p. 302. 
56. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 302-03. 
57. Roane at 94 (cited in note 20). 
58. See Wheaton's Reports, vol. 6, p. 378. 
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political influence; and, being without patronage, is without 
power-that its members are not, like those of our courts, at the 
same time, members of a Council of Revision having a direct 
agency in the enactment of laws-that no selfish motives are en-
listed in its defence, and that its fate depends on the good sense 
and patriotism of the country; when we compare its intrinsic im-
portance with its intrinsic weakness-we can be at no loss for the 
motives to which these incessant and virulent attacks are to be 
ascribed. These envenomed arrows, aimed at the most vulnera-
ble, and not the least vital part of the national government, are 
not shot at random. A mind of keen perception, looking stead-
fastly at its object, must perceive that, if a main pillar be crushed, 
the whole fabric will tumble into ruins. The opinion asserted, 
and the principles advanced throughout these Essays, though not 
avowing hostility to a union of the States in direct terms, are not 
to be misunderstood. They undermine and sap its very founda-
tion. No sagacious enemy of the Union will ever avow his pur-
pose, nor unfurl the banners of dismemberment. "DissoLUTION 
OF THE UNION," "DEATH TO THE CONSTITUTION," Will not be 
openly inscribed on the standard he raises: he will march to the 
combat under some other and more popular colours; he will seize 
some principle dear to the American heart, and, while pressing 
on to the overthrow of the government, will profess to limit his 
operations to the defence of that principle. 
Such a principle is "STATE RIGHTS." By every honest 
American, the States, and their rights, must ever be held sacred. 
His heart warms instinctively at their name; and feelings, not un-
like those which are aroused when the domestic fire-side is in-
vaded, are excited in his bosom when they are threatened. It is a 
passion which is universal, as well as spontaneous; not requiring 
the slow process of reasoning for its efficacy. The sentiment of 
national patriotism, which pervades the whole Union, is compar-
atively cold and inert. This local patriotism which attaches us to 
our State institutions is closely connected with all the associa-
tions of our youth, with the memory of the past, and the hopes of 
the future. He who appeals to it, appeals to all that is most dear 
to our prejudices and our affections. 
On another account, it is well adapted to promote the pur-
poses of those who are hostile to our present national system. 
The line of demarcation between the powers vested in the gen-
eral and the local governments, is not always so distinct as to be 
clearly perceived. It is not a mathematical, but a moral line. 
There are points in it on which the soundest understandings may 
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receive different impressions, and the most upright minds take 
different directions. It is easy to excite jealousies on those points, 
and to press those jealousies to a dangerous extreme. STATE 
RIGHTS, therefore, STATE SoVEREIGNTY, and STATE INDEPEN-
DENCE, are the magic words which present themselves to every 
individual who is discontented either with his government, or 
with his own situation in it. They are the ready weapons offered 
to every hand; and the manner only in which they are wielded 
can determine whether they are seized for offensive or defensive 
war. 
But strong as is our devotion to our local governments, de-
termined as is our resolution to maintain them in their just integ-
rity, it is not the only passion which ought to animate the 
American bosom. We cannot consider ourselves solely as 
Virginians, New-Yorkers, or Pennsylvanians.-We are also 
Americans.- In this, our great and national character, we are 
known to the world, and are respected by the world. In this char-
acter we achieved our Independence, and in this alone can we 
preserve it. The gallant deeds of arms performed by our country-
men as Americans, and which adorn the annals of our revolution 
and of our more recent contests with foreign nations, dwell upon 
our memories and are cherished in our recollections. Not only 
our fame and reknown, but our safety, and consequently our lib-
erty, depend upon this character. Maintaining it we are invulner-
able, parting with it we become the sport and the prey of 
mightier powers. Who then would be willing to break the ce-
ment which binds us together? Who would consent to see an 
enemy, or a jealous rival in a neighbouring State? If every feel-
ing of kindness and affection, if all the tender recollections of 
ancient friendship, of common dangers and common blessings 
could be effaced, who would willingly encounter the hazard of 
such a state of things. 
Reason then, and that sober reflection, which I trust will al-
ways compose a part of the character of our countrymen, de-
mand imperatively, the preservation of our national union. 
Reason, the history of the world, the human character, and our 
own experience, all combine to demonstrate that it can be pre-
served only by a national government, possessing sufficient pow-
ers to maintain itself, and to accomplish the purposes of its 
institution.-An alliance of sovereign states, however strict, is 
but an alliance still; and may be dissolved, or varied, at the will of 
every member, without any other penalty than the imperfect one 
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provided by the law of nationss9 for the infraction of treaties. To 
the sure preservation of our federal union, a GOVERNMENT is 
necessary; and a controul over its different members, so far as its 
powers extend, is inseparable from the very idea of government. 
The complete sovereignty and the complete independence of the 
parts, is incompatible with a government for the whole; and this 
complete independence of the States is only another term for 
their separation from each other. 
The Union, then, is to be maintained, as well as the indepen-
dence of the States; and these conflicting principles are to be rec-
onciled with each other. The American people sought to 
reconcile them; and have, for this purpose, framed a government, 
for themselves collectively, and for the different States into which 
they are divided. On the former of these governments they have 
conferred great and specific powers. The extent of these powers 
is to be measured, not by our several theories, but by the instru-
ment which confers them. In trying the legitimacy of any contro-
verted act, we ought not to bend the constitution to our theories, 
but ought to adapt our theories to the constitution. Let this 
course be pursued in the questions now before the public. 
N0.4 
(The American, July 26, 1821) 
The question discussed in the essays to which I have re-
ferred, is, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in a case where a State has prosecuted a citizen, for an act 
done in pursuance, as he alleges, of a law of the United States. 
He pleads the act of Congress in his defence; and on a case 
agreed, submitting the operation and validity of the act of Con-
gress to the Court in which the suit was brought, judgment is 
rendered against him, and the cause is brought, by writ of error, 
before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has affirmed 
that it has jurisdiction in such a case: Algernon Sidney denies it. 
The distinction between the right to examine and revise a 
judgment, and the subsequent decision on its merits, is so plain 
and obvious that one would think, it need only be mentioned to 
be at once admitted. Yet this writer, as if determined that the 
most self-evident truth, when asserted by the Supreme Court, 
shall not remain uncontradicted, has been extravagant enough to 
deny even this plain distinction. It is too apparent for argument, 
59. See Henry Wheaton, Elements of lntenwtional Law (Lea & Blanchard, 3d ed. 
1846); Henry Wheaton, The History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America 
(Gould, Banks & Co., 1845). 
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that a court may and must exercise jurisdiction over the question 
whether a judgment has or has not violated the constitution, 
before it can decide that question either affirmatively or nega-
tively. Inquiry must precede decision; and if inquiry be forbid-
den, it is as much forbidden when the constitution has, as when it 
has not been violated. Yet Algernon Sidney, as if confident in 
the possession of superhuman powers of intellect, and as if he 
were capable of maintaining, at the same time, the affirmative 
and negative of the same question, denies that the Court can 
enter upon the inquiry, and denies that this denial implies an af-
firmative of the proposition that, if the constitution be violated, it 
contains within itself no remedy for the mischief. 
But I will not dwell on such absurd paradoxes. In opening 
his argument, this writer more than insinuates that the Court has 
considered the necessity of this power as an excuse for usurping 
it. "Several modes of amending the constitution," he says, "being 
provided therein, the Supreme Court ought not, on the mere plea 
of danger, to interfere. This is always the tyrant's plea, and was 
the plea of the infamous ship-money judges, mentioned in my 
first number."60 
This imputation on the Court, which, in many other places, 
is still more distinctly and broadly asserted, is so often repeated, 
and constitutes so large a portion of the essays I am reviewing; is 
so highly favoured and so fondly cherished in them, that were it 
to be passed over in silence, the reader might be seduced into the 
suspicion that it had some foundation in fact. It might be thought 
scarcely possible that a writer, who supposed himself to be ad-
dressing a rational public, would be perpetually engaged in refut-
ing an argument which was never advanced, and contesting a 
proposition that was never made. Yet it is most certain that the 
Supreme Court, so far from adopting this idea, has expressly re-
pudiated it. 
After stating, with truth and with luminous perspicuity, the 
situation in which the national government would be placed by 
the establishment of the principles for which the State of Virginia 
contended, the court add: 
If such be the constitution, it is the duty of the Court to bow 
with respectful submission to its provisions. If such be not the 
constitution, it is equally the duty of this Court to say so; and 
to perform that task which the American people have assigned 
to the judicial department.61 
60. Roane at 93 (cited in note 20). 
61. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 3n. 
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So far from suggesting the idea that powers not delegated 
are to be assumed by construction, the court affirm the contrary; 
and the whole opinion proceeds upon the hypothesis, that the 
constitution is neither to be enlarged, nor contracted, but taken 
as it is. The triumph gained by disproving a proposition which 
was never advanced, which is entirely disclaimed, and which 
forms no part of the controversy, is a miserable triumph; and will 
never be sought for from those who are believed to possess the 
independence and the intellect to think for themselves. 
If, as contended by the Supreme Court, this question of ju-
risdiction entirely depends on the words of the constitution, we 
must resort to those words in order to determine it. The section 
which enumerates the cases in which jurisdiction is given to the 
tribunals of the Union, commences thus: "The judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority. "62 The section 
proceeding with its enumeration, describes different cases, in 
some of which, jurisdiction depends on the nature of the case; in 
others, on the character of the parties: but the clause just quoted 
is that which was supposed to authorize the national legislature 
to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in the case of Cohens 
against the State of Virginia. The court supposed, that where a 
defendant justifies under an act of Congress, and places his de-
fence entirely on that act, his case arises under a law of the United 
States; and that the jurisdiction which is expressly given in such 
case by the judiciary act of 1789, is constitutionally given. 
As the words which contain this grant of power have no allu-
sion to parties, but only describe the case, and as they give juris-
diction in all cases coming within the description, containing no 
exception of any party whatever, the court (it seems) did not 
think itself at liberty to insert an exception which the constitution 
had not made, but held itself bound by that instrument as it 
stands. Indeed, such an interpolation would have been wholly 
unjustifiable. Had the enumeration stopped here, and had no ju-
risdiction been conferred in consequence of the character of the 
parties, could we have listened for a moment to any man who 
would persuade us that the character of the parties was in any 
manner to influence the question as to what cases were included 
in the clause? And yet it will not surely be pretended that the 
subsequent part of the section can have the effect of weakening 
62. U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. 
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that part which has been quoted. A grant of additional jurisdic-
tion cannot deduct from that which was previously granted.63 
It is vehemently contended by Algernon Sidney, if I under-
stand him, that the clauses of the constitution which give jurisdic-
tion to the courts of the Union, in consequence of the nature of 
the case, are restrained and limited by those which give it in con-
sequence of the character of the parties; and that those persons 
only who have a right to bring their suits in the national courts, 
whatever may be the nature of the controversy, have a right to 
claim the judgment of those courts in cases to which the constitu-
tion has expressly extended their jurisdiction, without any refer-
ence to the character of the parties. 
If any proposition coming from that quarter could surprize 
me, this would. I should have thought it too extravagant to be 
hazarded by the wildest zealot of faction. The constitution enu-
merates the several classes of cases to which ~e judicial power of 
the Union shall extend, in terms as clear and distinct as our lan-
guage affords. These cases have no connexion with, or depen-
dence on, each other; and when either of them arises, it forms of 
itself, without other auxiliary, a distinct and substantive ground 
of jurisdiction. A case arising under a law of the United States, is 
one case; a case arising under a treaty, is another; a case between 
citizens of different states, is a third. Should we not be over-
whelmed with astonishment to hear a man say that a case arising 
under a law of the United States would not be cognizable in the 
courts of the Union, unless it also arose under a treaty? Is it a 
less obvious and glaring misconstruction of the constitution, to 
say that a case arising under a law of the United States will not 
be cognizable in the courts of the Union, unless the parties be-
tween whom it arose were citizens of different states? Might it 
not, with at least as much semblance of propriety, be contended 
that citizens of different states could not come into the federal 
courts, unless their cases arose under the constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the Union? Most certainly it might. The words of the 
section no more make cases arising under the constitution, laws, 
63. In treating the two categories of jurisdiction over cases and controversies as in-
dependent sources of federal judicial power, Wheaton joined the company of Marshall 
and Story as well as that of the nation's first attorney-general. Edmund Randolph offered 
a similar account of the two categories of jurisdiction in his 1790 report to Congress on 
the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Repon of the Attorney-General to the House of Representa-
tives, in Maeva Marcus, ed., 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Coun of the 
United States, 1789-1800 at 163 (Columbia U. Press, 1992) ("[C)ases ... between any 
persons or bodies whatsoever ... are not without the reach of the judiciary power of the 
United States. For the subsequent descriptions of persons and bodies, spread, instead of 
contracting the jurisdiction."). 
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or treaties of the United States dependent upon the character of 
the parties, in order to attribute those cases to the federal juris-
diction, than they make cases between citizens of different states, 
dependent for the same purpose on the character of the contro-
versy. If any distinction could be drawn between them, it would 
be in favour of that class of cases which is first in importance and 
first in the enumeration. And yet what a clumsiness in the use of 
language does the construction, which would exclude either from 
the federal jurisdiction, impute to the framers of the constitution! 
How little they merit the imputation the public well know. Of all 
human compositions, their work may be cited as a model of per-
spicuity and precision. 
If cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States, must also arise between parties who have a right 
to claim the federal jurisdiction independent of their case, does 
not the same principle apply to cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction? I should be glad to understand how these classes of 
cases are to be distinguished from each other. I should be glad to 
be informed by what rule, other than the "Sic volo, sic jubeo" of 
arbitrary caprice, they are to be distinguished. So that upon this 
construction, a prize cause, or a suit for seaman's wages, could 
not be brought in the District Court, unless the parties were citi-
zens of different states, or aliens; and the Court of Admiralty, 
which, if I mistake not, still exists in Virginia, although I believe 
it is seldom drawn down from the clouds, might once more have 
an active being, and the prerogative of our own Governor as "ad-
miral of the navy" of this state might be something more than an 
empty pageant. 
But, to speak with a seriousness becoming the subject, there 
is nothing, nothing even plausible, nothing which can impose on 
the most unthinking, in this new and wild notion, that separate 
classes of cases, perfectly distinct in their description of charac-
ter, shall be blended together, and forced by arbitrary construc-
tion into a mutual dependence on each other. If this may be 
done, there is an end of the constitution. It becomes what Alger-
non Sidney pleases to make it. 
This rule, then, if it can be called one, must be abandoned; 
and we must adhere to the constitution, which expressly extends 
the jurisdiction of the national courts to all cases arising under 
the constitution and laws of the United States,64 without any ex-
ception of parties.-After reviewing this section, the court say, 
"[a] case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party as 
64. U.S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. 
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well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the 
constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct 
decision depends on the construction of either."6s The court 
proceed: 
The jurisdiction of the Court, then, being extended by the let-
ter of the constitution to all cases arising under it, or under the 
laws of the United States, it follows that those who would 
withdraw any case of this description from that jurisdiction, 
must sustain the exemption they claim on the spirit and true 
meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true meaning 
must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers 
have employed. 
The counsel for the defendant in error have undertaken 
to do this; and have laid down the general proposition, that a 
sovereign independent State is not suable, except by its own 
consent.66 
The court then contend that this consent has been given. 
Having before shown that it was given in the letter of the consti-
tution, the opinion next proceeds to show that the spirit of the 
instrument conforms to its letter. The general object and pur-
pose of the American people in framing their government, as evi-
denced by their history, by their situation and circumstances, and 
by the text of the constitution itself, are brought into view; and 
the arguments with which the counsel for Virginia sought to 
maintain the exception on which they rested their motion to dis-
miss the writ of error, are fairly and fully considered. A course 
of demonstration, complete in every link of the chain of reason-
ing, and which has not yet been fairly met, and I venture to say 
never will be, is thus concluded: 
After bestowing on this subject the most attentive considera-
tion, the Court can perceive no reason founded on the charac-
ter of the parties for introducing an exception which the 
constitution has not made; and we think that the judicial 
power, as originally given, extends to all cases arising under 
the constitution or a law of the United States, whoever may be 
the parties.67 
This language certainly cannot be misunderstood; and it is 
too clear for controversy that the court found their opinion on 
the letter of the constitution, and on the express grant of jurisdic-
tion in the very case which the words of that instrument plainly 
65. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 379. 
66. ld. at 379-80 (emphasis added). 
67. ld. at 392. 
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import. The learned counsel who was instructed to object to this 
jurisdiction, contended that an exception not expressed must be 
implied from the nature of the government and the spirit of the 
constitution. It is professedly for the purpose of meeting that ar-
gument, that the nature of the government is considered. The 
court do not analyze the constitution for the purpose of ex-
tracting from its spirit something which may supply any omis-
sions in its words, but for the purpose of showing the entire 
accordance between its spirit and its words; and that equal vio-
lence would be done to both by implying an exception, not ex-
pressed, to words importing a general grant. Yet Algernon 
Sidney affects to consider these arguments as being urged by the 
court to show the necessity and propriety of taking jurisdiction 
where it was not given; of taking it by implication. In a laborious 
criticism on separate sentences, which are almost uniformly tor-
tured and perverted from their true and plain sense, he continu-
ally repeats, either that the mischievous effects arising from his 
construction might not be real, or that, if real, the constitution 
ought to be so amended as to prevent them. He continually rep-
resents these arguments of the court, not as defending the literal 
construction of the constitution as it now exists, but as asserting a 
right to alter it. 
Why is this done? Would these willful misstatements be 
made by a man whose object was truth rather than victory? 
Would they be addressed to readers who were not believed to be 
predisposed to take any course which a chosen leader might 
mark out for them, and to swallow every nostrum, however nau-
seous, which he might prepare? But I trust he is mistaken.-
Surely the reading public of Virginia must be too intelligent, en-
lightened, and independent, to be classed with the abject and de-
luded followers of "the veiled Prophet." 
Algernon Sidney labours to show that the principle for 
which the counsel of Virginia contended in the Supreme Court, is 
correct. He labours to show that one sovereign cannot be ame-
nable to the tribunals of another without his own consent;68 and 
that, in cases of compact neither party is at liberty to construe the 
agreement to the exclusion of the other.69 In support of these 
68. See, e.g., Roane at 80 (cited in note 20) ("It is an anomaly in the science of 
government, that the courts of one independent government, are to control and reverse 
the judgments of the courts of another.") 
69. See, e.g., id. 
That is no federal republic, in which one of the parties to the compact, claims the 
exclusive right to pass finally upon the chartered rights of another. In such a 
government there is no common arbiter of their rights but the people. If this 
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propositions, he heaps authority on authority, and piles quota-
tion on quotation, till he supposes his principles to be surrounded 
with an impassable rampart. But all this is a work of supereroga-
tion. These propositions have never been controverted by any 
body; and the Supreme Court admits in terms, the general propo-
sition that a sovereign, independent state is not suable, except by 
its own consent;?o and avowedly relies on the constitution itself 
to prove the consent of Virginia in the particular case then under 
consideration. Neither has the court been so absurd as to con-
tend that when two independent powers enter into a compact, 
which does not impair that independence, either of them is at 
liberty to expound it to the exclusion of the other. The judges 
are not yet sufficiently ripe for Bedlam to maintain such a 
proposition. 
The difficulty lies, not in proving the truth of these abstract 
propositions, but in applying them to the question under discus-
sion. Hie labor, hoc opus est and so far as Algernon Sidney has 
attempted the achievement, he has, in my humble apprehension, 
totally failed. The basis of his whole argument appears to be the 
complete sovereignty and independence of the several states. 
This is his postulatum, his great principle to which every thing is 
to be accommodated, his lever with which the world is to be 
moved. Do the words and spirit of the constitution impugn this 
complete independence? Do they limit, restrain, and modify it? 
Then they must be so tortured and misconstrued as to be recon-
ciled to it. The government of the several states must stand in 
the same relation to that of the Union, as any one independent 
power of the world stands to another: as France to Britain, or 
Prussia to Sweden. 
H this proposition be true, there is an end of the contro-
versy, and an end of the Union. Hit be not true, there is an end 
of the argument of Algernon Sidney. 
On this point, Algernon Sidney and the Supreme Court of 
the U. States are admitted to be in direct opposition to each 
other. The Court considers our Union, not as an alliance of in-
dependent sovereigns, but as a GoVERNMENT, instituted by the 
PEoPLE of this country for certain great purposes, deemed by 
them all important; and endowed for the accomplishment of 
these purposes with certain great powers and authorities, which 
I d. 
power of decision is once conceded to either party, the equilibrium established 
by the constitution is destroyed, and the compact exists thereafter, but in name. 
70. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 380. 
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are expressed in the charter by which it is created.n In the exer-
cise of these powers, this government is, necessarily supreme, 
and is expressly declared to be so. The existence of such a gov-
ernment is incompatible with the complete, unlimited sover-
eignty of the states. The question, therefore, must always be, not 
whether a particular act of this supreme legislature be consistent 
with state sovereignty, but whether it is authorized by the 
constitution. 
71. See id. at 380-81. 
